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## Viewing cable 06BOGOTA4988, PEACE COMMISSIONER TELLS AMBASSADOR ABOUT PENDING

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### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#06BOGOTA4988**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">06BOGOTA4988</a>	<a href="#">2006-06-05 16:13</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">CONFIDENTIAL</a>	Embassy Bogota

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.semana.com/nacion/wikileaks-castano-anticipo-luis-restrepo-surgimiento-nuevas-bandas-criminales/160788-3.aspx>

VZCZCXYZ0014  
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #4988/01 1561613  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
P 051613Z JUN 06  
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5636  
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6861  
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7791  
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN LIMA 3853  
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9207  
RUEHQD/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4491  
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3588  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC  
RHEHOND/DIRONDPC WASHDC  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004988

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2015

TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO

SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER TELLS AMBASSADOR ABOUT PENDING PROBLEMS WITH DEMOBILIZED PARAMILITARIES

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.

Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY  
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¶1. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo said in a May 26 meeting with Ambassador Wood that he expects dissident factions of the paramilitary groups to demobilize soon. The GOC expects to confront the few remaining paramilitary groups who refused to lay down their arms. Restrepo said the GOC is concerned about the emergence of a new generation of criminal organizations, and called on the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) to begin Justice and Peace legal processing as soon possible. End summary.

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LAST TWO DEMOBILIZATIONS EXPECTED  
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¶2. (C) Restrepo noted that the last two groups to demobilize are the final faction of the Elmer Cardenas Bloc and the Cacique Pipinta. The Constitutional Court's press release on the Justice and Peace (J&P) Law on May 18, however, had persuaded them to postpone their demobilization until after the presidential election. This 800-strong faction of the Elmer Cardenas Bloc, which was a dissident AUC bloc in Choco and Antioquia departments, is led by one of the founders of the AUC and a loyal friend of former AUC leader Carlos Castano, AKA "El Aleman." Restrepo explained that the reason behind the delay in demobilizing is that the GOC has not been able to supply the necessary security in this crucial corridor that leads to Panama. The fear by the locals is that the FARC, which is currently located in the south of Choco Department, would take over once the bloc demobilizes.

¶3. (C) The CaciquiPipinta Bloc, which is a dissident faction of the Central Bolivar Bloc, is made up of some 300 men that operate in the north of Caldas Department. Even though this group is linked with AUC political leader Ernesto Baez, Restrepo explained that it really does not belong to anyone, and the group members do not accept orders from Baez.

The faction's leaders have told Restrepo they have not wanted to associate themselves with Baez and other more recognized AUC leaders like "Macaco" because they did not want to link themselves with narcotrafficking. Restrepo noted that this group is mainly known to be involved in extortion.

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REMAINING AND RE-EMERGING GROUPS, A MAJOR GOC CONCERN  
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¶4. (C) Restrepo warned that the GOC was not going to accept the demobilizations of any additional groups besides Elmer Cardenas and Cacique Pipinta. Restrepo had already instructed the Operational Community for Laying Down Arms (CODA), which certifies the demobilization of the individual deserters, not to accept anymore AUC members. He thought it was important that the GOC demonstrate its willingness to confront these groups.

¶5. (C) One group that has chosen not to demobilize, the Martin Llanos Bloc, located in Casanare Department, has been in inconclusive talks with the GOC for sometime now. Restrepo described his talks with this group among the most difficult and complicated. Restrepo said he gets the "chills" every time he talks to them. Their philosophy is very similar to the FARC; they want the GOC to offer them territory to control. According to Colombian intelligence

reports, some factions of this bloc are being regrouped into new criminal organizations led by Hector Buitrago, who is the father of Martin Llanos.

¶6. (C) Restrepo explained that the GOC is calling this phenomenon the "new emerging anti-communist criminal groups,"

of which there are between 10 to 30 (reftel). One of the most prominent is the New Generation Group (ONG) located in the Pacific Coast of Narino Department and led by former paramilitary leader "Varela," who has been associated with the North Valle drug cartel. Other groups that are becoming well-known around the country are the "Aguilas" (Eagles) and "Halcones" (Falcons).

¶7. (C) In a conversation Restrepo had with former AUC founder Carlos Castano in 2003, Castano warned he was fearful of the possibility of new groups forming whose membership included former members of the mafia, AUC, and FARC. This combination would be very dangerous and hard to detect since they would have the know-how and experience of the three groups and they would operate in small groups of 8 to 10 men.

¶8. (C) The Ambassador related his most recent trip to Tumaco on the Pacific Coast and how concerned he was with the vulnerability of this region where problems of overpopulation, poverty, drugs, lack of infrastructure, and ELN and FARC pressure converged. In conversations with locals, he heard of the growing presence of the ELN and their gradual involvement in the drug trade. ELN fronts in Narino appear to be independent from the ELN's Central Command (COCE).

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JUSTICE AND PEACE LISTS ON HOLD: FISCALIA FEARFUL  
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¶9. (C) Restrepo warned the Fiscalia must start processing those on the Justice and Peace list soon to avoid the risk of "a return to the mountains". Restrepo expressed frustration with the Ministry of Interior and Justice (MoIJ) and the Fiscalia for sitting on the lists that he turned in over a month ago. He said it took him three months to convince over 2,284 paramilitaries to sign up for J&P and now this effort might be in vain. Of the 2,284, only 200 to 250 had open cases, which meant that over 2,000 were willing to testify to things the State was not aware of or did not have sufficient information about. Moreover, there were 2,400 individuals in prisons who have included their names on the lists. This was a historic opportunity that could go to waste if the Fiscalia did not act quickly. According to Restrepo, the Fiscalia should at least focus on the 200 paramilitary leaders who have open cases.

¶10. (C) Restrepo understood that the Fiscalia has been unable to process all these cases at once, but should try to focus its resources on this endeavor. Instead, between the MoIJ and the Fiscalia, they have been sending messages back and forth to his office, in his view, to obstruct movement on the lists. Restrepo noted that his relationship with Minister of Interior and Justice Sabas Pretelt was worsening. Pretelt was constantly meeting with paramilitary leaders and "speaking badly about him behind his back." Restrepo said Pretelt and Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran are fearful of what is to come: Pretelt, because he will have a hard time fulfilling the behind-the-scenes promises he made to these individuals, and Iguaran, because he is primarily responsible for the success of this process. Restrepo criticized Pretelt for having a poor understanding of the reality of the former combatants. For example, in a Cabinet meeting, Pretelt reported that over 70 percent of demobilized paramilitaries are currently employed and the true figure is close to 7 percent. (In a May 29 meeting with the Ambassador, Pretelt said 11,675 former paramilitaries are employed in one form or another, or about 35 percent of the total.)

ARMS BEING TURNED OVER TO THE FISCALIA

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¶11. (C) Restrepo told the Ambassador the GOC was in the process of handing over to the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) 128 tons of arms turned in by the demobilized

paramilitaries. The GOC would like to consolidate these arms in one location as soon as possible since they are located in 23 different cities around the country. The GOC's Antiterrorist Analysis Interinstitutional Group (GIAT)--responsible for registering the trafficking of weapons--has already recorded and identified the origin of the arms (septel). The Fiscalia is supposed to use GIAT records in its investigations and help determine which are to be deposited or destroyed. Restrepo said, for security reasons, all explosive material that was turned over by the demobilized blocs had already been destroyed. Anecdotally, Restrepo commented that in just one of the demobilizations, 1,500 grenades were handed over in a truck as if they had been potatoes.

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AMBASSADOR WILL VOICE CONCERNS

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¶12. (C) The Ambassador said the GOC needs to do a better job at monitoring the demobilized paramilitaries and cracking down on these newly formed criminal groups (septel). This process cannot be voluntary; the State needs to go after those unwilling to cooperate. If there are insufficient resources, the GOC needs to refocus its efforts. The USG has authorized aid to the GOC, but the monies cannot be delivered if the GOC does not show strong commitment to the process.

WOOD

=====CABLE ENDS=====